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Abi Doukhan, Emmanuel Levinas: A Philosophy of Exile (United Kingdom: 
Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy, 2012), pp xi + 162, ISBN: 
978-1-4411-9576-0. 
 
Abi Doukhan’s study of Levinas, A Philosophy in Exile, begins with the claim 
that, “[t]his study of the dimensions of exile in the philosophy of Levinas shall 
prove profoundly topical and relevant in that it will allow for a reframing of the 
concept of exile in a more positive light and enable a new perspective to 
emerge on the present problem of exile undergone by our societies” (p. 3). For 
a philosophical work not necessarily aimed at religious studies, this statement 
is important. Exile, equally termed diaspora in certain contexts, is a fact of 
religious life. As Doukhan notes in the opening pages, Levinas’ philosophy is 
acutely aware of the problem of the ‘other’ faced by all societies. As such, this 
is a book that scholars of religion should be interested in, so long as it can shed 
philosophical light upon topics we are already engaged with. The question, of 
course, is whether the content justifies that interest.  
Each chapter deals with the question of exile in relation to the topics of 
ethics, politics, love, epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics respectively. 
Underwriting all these chapters is the thesis that exile, rather than being 
detrimental to the social fabric of our lives, is the glue that holds it all together. 
Such an understanding of exile may not sit well with Western readers. Nor 
should it, as Levinas’ philosophy is a stern critique of the Western ethos, and as 
Doukhan argues, it has more resonance with Judaism. For those of us rendered 
squeamish by theologically-injected religious studies, for once, at least, the 
theology is not Christian. Such qualms are, however, unnecessary. Doukhan 
devotes a number of pages to the theological status of Levinas and makes the 
interesting point that he was not using philosophy to bolster Hebrew thought, 
but rather using Hebrew thought as a tool to challenge the orientations of our 
Western thought. While Levinas may use Hebrew tools, Doukhan informs us, 
his starting point is first and foremost phenomenological.  
It must be admitted, however, that Doukhan’s study is largely 
underwhelming. In each individual chapter, Doukhan notes some of the 
detractors of Levinas’ philosophy in that particular area and goes on to 
explicate why they are wrong. More often than not, these explications are less 
than convincing, and do not address certain key issues. The problem is that 
Doukhan is so desperate to demonstrate that exile is a fundamental concept in 
all these areas that she does not really devote enough time to them (the book is 
only 124 pages long). This is most apparent in the chapter on exile and love. 
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Doukhan is so concerned to shoehorn exile into the debate that certain 
concluding remarks struck me, even as a male reader, as rather odd. We are told 
that, in the Levinassian perspective, woman gains her status as a person by 
man’s hospitality (p. 66). Doukhan, as a female author, raises no objections to 
this point whatsoever. As for exile in the case of love, it may be made to fit, but 
in all the other cases I am left with the impression that exile does not add much 
to the discussion. Constant uses of such phrases as “…even exile,” “…or exile,” 
and “…and exile” give the impression that exile is being strained to cover 
topics that already have adequate conceptual terms available. 
Nevertheless, this book contains some useful discussions. The chapter on 
epistemology and truth is particularly interesting. Doukhan’s strongest 
argument is in response to Foucault and subsequent thinking that would lead to 
an abandonment of truth. It is followed by an equally interesting argument that 
truth can only be properly be reached by the interrupted self, that is, a self that 
has put itself into question. Similarly, the first section of the chapter on 
metaphysics presents a novel approach understanding belief in God. The second 
part, however, falls into sketchy theological territory that serves to underwrite 
the general problem of the whole book. Doukhan’s opinion that exile should be 
portrayed in positive lights seems at odds with the historical opening recounting 
Levinas’ own experiences of exile. The portrayal of exile is far too optimistic 
and, as such, strains the argument of the book. Doukhan’s optimism never 
seems justified, and while I am convinced of the importance of exile to society, 
the positive reading of it as the glue that holds society together appears flimsy. 
For readers of Religious Studies and the topic of exile generally, there is not 
much that is new, but those with a keener interest in the philosophy of Levinas 
may find the study more relevant. The basic flaw of this book is its length. 
There is too little space devoted to each topic to give a convincing argument 
and there is a problematic lack of detail. Had Doukhan focused on just the one 
area I would probably have been more convinced of the validity of her 
argument.  
 
Jonathan Tuckett 
University of Stirling 
 
 
Richard Gombrich, What the Buddha Thought  (London and Oakville: Equinox 
Publishing, 2009), pp. xvi + 240, ISBN: 9781845536145 (Pbk). 
 
Richard Gombrich is a well-known British Scholar of Early Buddhism. His 
book, What the Buddha Thought, is based on a series of ten lectures he gave at 
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the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University in 2006 under 
the general title, ‘The Original and Greatness of the Buddha’s Ideas’ (p. vii). 
Gombrich intends the book for two audiences: for experts in the field, and for a 
wider public with some prior familiarity with Buddhist thought. Written in a 
relaxed and accessible style, one feels as though one is invited on a journey of 
discovery with the author. From the outset, Gombrich argues against the 
scholarly idea that we cannot know what the Buddha thought; that Buddhism 
“is a ball that was set rolling by someone whose ideas are not known” and “can 
never be known” (p. 194), that we only know what was preserved in the 
earliest scriptures which were begun to be written some 150 or so years after 
the Buddha’s death.  
Conversely, Gombrich argues for the idea that it is possible to know 
what the Buddha thought, and sets out to explain how the coherent set of core 
concepts of the Buddha’s worldview took shape within the context of 
Brahmanical thought. He argues that the Buddha’s attacks on Brahmanical 
ideas were conducted using metaphor and irony, and that the substance of the 
Buddha’s arguments therefore lose something if one attempts to take them 
literally. To aid his cause, Gombrich maintains that in order to fully appreciate 
the formulation of the Buddha’s worldview as a response to Brahmanism and 
Jainism, one must understand the entire set of key Buddhist terms and explore 
the semantic range of each one, including their literal and metaphorical uses. 
He applies this method throughout the set of chapters devoted to exploring key 
Buddhist terms such as karma, ‘no soul’ (Skt: anatman), compassion, non-
random causation, and nirvana. 
Gombrich states that he has used ‘no soul’ and karma (moral causality) 
as the starting points for his explanation of the Buddha’s core teaching, rather 
than the Buddha’s own—and the entire Buddhist tradition’s—starting point of 
the Four Noble Truths, the truth of dukkha (Pali, usually translated as 
suffering), because the Buddha was preaching to an audience who had 
preconceptions different to ours, which included rebirth of a continuous 
essence, and some notion of karma as moral causation (p. 16). In the Buddha’s 
thought, the concept of ‘no soul’ has to be understood in terms of the doctrine 
of karma, because the view of the soul or self that is subject to change 
according to the action of karma as intention rather than as ritual action, means 
that salvation is possible through mental purification. The Buddha made the 
belief in the law of karma, ‘right view’, the first step on his Noble Eightfold 
path to Nirvana; in so doing, says Gombrich, the Buddha was the first to 
formulate an “ethicization of rebirth” (pp. 31-32), which included the means to 
generate good karma, rather than just eliminate bad karma, as Jainism had held 
to. Whilst I confess to having some reservation about how certain we can be in 
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regard to the facts concerning the historical Buddha at this remove, I am 
impressed by both Gombrich’s scholarship and by the favourable treatment it 
receives in the review by Dhivan Thomas Jones in Western Buddhist Review 5 
(2010). 
However, as an ethnographer interested in contemporary expressions of 
the Buddhist tradition, I am intrigued by Gombrich’s starting point, and by the 
fact that he leaves meditation and the Monastic order “almost entirely outside 
the scope of the book” (p. 17). Much Buddhist scholarship in the West, and 
also Buddhist practices favoured in the West such as Zen and Vipassana 
meditation, which have contributed to the formation of a modernist Western 
Buddhism, have emphasised the monastic over the lay expressions of 
Buddhism, and the means to attain personal salvation largely without reference 
to the doctrine of karma and rebirth. Similarly, the contemporary dialogue 
between Buddhism and Western Psychology has maintained a focus on the 
efficacy of Buddhist meditation practices as self-transformative and therapeutic 
techniques isolated from their traditional framework. Perhaps an unintended 
benefit of What the Buddha Thought is its demonstration of the centrality of the 
doctrine of karma and rebirth to the Buddhist worldview. 
 
Glenys Eddy 
University of Sydney 
 
 
William D. Romanowski, Reforming Hollywood: How American Protestants 
Fought For Freedom at the Movies (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. xv + 298, ISBN: 97801 95387841 (Hdbk). 
 
There is a long history of American cinema’s entanglement with authorised 
and unauthorised forms of censorship. Thomas Doherty’s comprehensive study 
of Hollywood’s pre-code era (1999) accounts for the complex interrelationship 
of production, distribution, and consumption of Hollywood’s output. Gregory 
Black’s two influential studies of the Catholic confrontation with the ‘movie 
establishment’ (1994 and 1998) provide a full account of the religious and 
moral foundations of Hollywood’s encounter with American mores. What sets 
William Romanowski’s recent Reforming Hollywood apart is a detailed, 
analytical, and thoroughly engaging account of the impact of Protestant 
religious machinery on the development of the studio system. Prior studies 
have correctly emphasised the importance of Catholicism’s Legion of Decency 
(formed in 1933) in providing an ethical life of cinema through the 
administration of the Catholic Church. Romanowski, however, counters the 
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discourse that sets the framework as a confrontation between only two major 
players: the studio system (and its oligopolistic organisation) and the Catholic 
Church. But as Reforming Hollywood clearly shows, equally important is the 
Protestant contribution to the American film experience, which instantiates a 
confrontation both with Hollywood and the Catholic Church. The movies 
provide the expression for a hotbed of “ethno-religious rivalries” (p. 13). 
Precisely how did the ‘movies’—that behemoth of American twentieth 
century culture—evolve as a moral, ethical, social, and cultural phenomenon? 
For Romanowski, as for many other commentators, the movies are a part of an 
American industrial machine that gives rise to various processes of cultural 
modernisation. Yet rather than displaying an abrupt departure from a religious 
cultural history, the movies negotiate and actively work with the powerful 
moral imperatives of Protestant and Catholic instruction. As movies become a 
mass culture, so the American religious establishment intervenes in the 
dissemination of this new mass-cultural art form to steer it toward the pursuit 
of instruction, guidance, and virtue. By 1915, the Protestant National Council 
of the Churches of Christ “hinged on assuring that audiences would encounter 
nothing indecent or harmful at the movies” (p. 21). This was not censorship, 
which the council fought against. Rather, it was a form of moral and ethical 
guidance that fundamentally designed (in collaboration with profit-motivated 
corporations) the American movies in the pre-code era (-1933), the era of the 
Hays Code (1933-1968), and, as I would argue, the current output of America’s 
newly integrated studio system. 
The structure of the book maps the history of the development of cinema 
as an early mass cultural form (studio distribution and broad-based theatrical 
exhibition) to the era of the Hays Code, and concludes with an examination of 
the gradual fragmentation of the code and cinema’s governing bureaucracies. 
Chapter 1 sets the groundwork with a detailed study of the Protestant National 
Council and its focus on guiding the development of cinema. A brief though 
fascinating piece on Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915) describes the 
framework for later negotiations between the National Council and the Motion 
Picture Producers and Distributors Association (headed by Will Hays). The 
decades long struggle between the Protestant Council and the MPPDA forms 
the guiding dramatic narrative of the book. As Romanowski’s engaging style 
reveals, this is as colourful a history as the tumultuous history of the studio 
system itself.  
The book devotes significant space to the Hays Code era, as it must. Yet 
here again the material feels fresh, inflected as it is through the marginalised 
perspective of Protestant governing bodies. Alongside the widely accepted 
histories of Hays, Breen, and the studio era under the code, fascinating also is 
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the substantial contribution made by Protestant organisations: church groups, 
governing bodies, media sources, even Protestant filmmakers. Several case 
studies make what could have been a dry history a dramatic and fascinating 
narrative. The monumental success of DeMille’s The Ten Commandments 
(1956) is matched by the failure of The Greatest Story Ever Told a decade 
later. As late as the mid-1960s, in the era of Lumet’s controversial The 
Pawnbroker (1966) and The Graduate (1967), the American ‘movies’ were 
still uncensored, self-regulating, and heavily influenced by the moral and 
ethical imperatives of the American religious establishment. At the point of the 
collapse of the code, and for decades after, American movies and American 
religion were tightly knitted and mutually affecting.  
Romanowki’s Reforming Hollywood is an important, timely study. It 
redresses a lacuna in the historical foundations of Hollywood, deftly 
accounting for the crucial role Protestant religious bodies had to play in the 
development of an American cinematic imaginary. But Romanowski also 
reminds us just how complex the edifice of ‘the movies’ is. The end of the code 
and the turn toward more clearly regulated guidance of movies (classification 
rather than censorship) matches the profound, ground-shifting change in the 
movies themselves. The Graduate and Bonnie and Clyde (1968) are not 
precisely ‘late’ or ‘post’-code films, but are fundamentally part of the 
institution of American cultural life. This life, as Romanowski’s book suggests, 
is expressed in terms that included the cinema output under the Hays Code and 
the post-code classification system. For Romanowski, “the rating system 
contributed to the making of a ‘Hollywood Renaissance’” (p. 185). That 
Renaissance was a rebirth precisely because it rubbed against the grain of a 
moral and ethical establishment that had governed the American movies since 
its inception.  
 
Bruce Isaacs 
University of Sydney 
 
 
Joyce Ransome, The Web of Friendship: Nicholas Ferrar and Little Gidding 
(James Clarke, Cambridge, 2011), pp. 291, ISBN: 9780227173480. 
 
The settlement at Little Gidding, in the abolished county of Huntingdonshire, 
near Cambridge, is best known today as the subject of the last of T.S. Eliot’s 
Four Quartets where the poet writes of his visit to the church there in 1936, 
and also of King Charles’s visit, in 1645, as “a broken king,” after the defeat at 
Naseby in the Civil War. “You are here to kneel,” Eliot declares, “where prayer 
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has been valid.” For an Anglo-Catholic of literary and historical interests, such 
as Eliot, Little Gidding had powerful associations with such seventeenth-
century poets as George Herbert (who bequeathed The Temple to the 
community’s founder) and Richard Crashaw, and with the upheavals of 
ecclesiastical and political life in those years; but also, by virtue of its ordered 
community structure, with a version of monasticism and a sense of retreat from 
the world. It was criticised, in its day, as ‘the Arminian nunnery’. 
Joyce Ransome’s new study puts these notions and the somewhat 
romanticised ideas that have developed through the centuries about the 
individuals gathered in Christian community at Little Gidding under scrutiny, 
rigorously although sympathetically—this is not a new-historicist demolition 
exercise—and shows that the place, its principles, its personalities, and its 
story, at large, are more complicated than we had supposed and, thereby, more 
interesting. 
What emerges is a “new and complex picture” (p. 13) of Nicholas 
Ferrar, the founder of a community which, Ransome argues, was not static but 
“evolving” (p. 20). Her emphasis on its voluntary nature—a major theme of the 
book—clearly differentiates the communal life of Little Gidding from the 
vowed obedience of a religious order. She also stresses the emphasis on 
women’s education in a situation where women outnumbered men (p. 15), but 
does not underestimate the gifts or influence of Ferrar, the “unusually pious 
and intellectually able” celibate in charge (p. 29). But 
his character was neither simple nor without fault. He was a model 
of piety, a generous and learned friend, an ingenious and dedicated 
teacher. Yet he could be at once controlling and self-effacing, open 
and secretive, wary of spontaneity while valuing voluntarism, a 
mystic and a micromanager (p. 23). 
Details are given of Ferrar’s education and travels on the continent 
(where, in Holland, for example, he experienced various sects and voluntary 
Christian societies, although he would never countenance separation from the 
established Church at home) and of the subsequent familial financial issues 
behind the eventual removal from London to distant Huntingdonshire of the 
wider Ferrar family. The purchase of Little Gidding was not inspired merely by 
renunciation of “the world,” Ransome insists—it was not “a simple exchange 
of hectic London life for contemplative country retreat” (p. 50). Yet surely, like 
George Herbert’s recourse to Bemerton in Wiltshire, there was more of this 
element than Ransome is willing to concede in her determination to 
differentiate Little Gidding from monastic withdrawal: it was “a family 
household and not a cloister” (p. 72) she maintains. But strict observance of 
such as a version of the monastic hours and Laudian liturgical innovations 
(processions, obeisance to the altar, and so forth) contradict her presentation of 
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a more temperate Anglicanism. Ransome is wise, however, as she traverses the 
theological and liturgical minefield of early seventeenth-century faith and 
practice, to reflect: 
Perhaps doctrinal consistency under whatever label is not a helpful 
measure of the ‘practical divinity’ of either Ferrar or Herbert or 
indeed many of their contemporaries (p. 122). 
Those keen to label George Herbert and his poetry as Calvinist (the current 
reading)—or as Laudian, for that matter (as in the past)—should take note. 
If Gidding was a “family household,” it was a decidedly odd family, 
with the diaconal patriarch unmarried, requiring uniformity of habit-like drab 
clothing by his female attendants and eliciting letters of “anxious confessions 
of sin” from his nieces (p. 73) in “a household dedicated to God’s service” (p. 
79). As in the cloister, indeed, the ordinary worship required of the laity in The 
Book of Common Prayer was insufficient, and there were “hourly readings 
from the gospel harmony” (p. 79), for which Gidding became famous, and 
memorising of the psalms. Ferrar wanted the place to be “a Light on a Hill” for 
a corrupt age (p. 134).  
But the Psalmist’s vision of “brethren dwelling together in unity” was 
not fulfilled there. One of the most interesting (and, perhaps unintentionally, 
amusing) characters in the narrative is Ferrar’s sister-in-law, Bathsheba, 
“deeply antipathetic” to Nicholas, “and to the life he had established for the 
household at Gidding” (p. 81). Bathsheba appears to have taken opposition to 
the regime as her métier, resisting any proposal from Ferrar, her husband, or 
their sister Susanna, “even were it something that she would otherwise have 
wanted to do” (p. 109). She, for one, was not about to submit to the insisted-
upon quality of temperance to which her husband’s unfortunate financial 
circumstances had consigned her, let alone its “web of friendship” presided 
over by her brother-in-law. 
Ransome gives a detailed analysis of the thirteen complete harmonies – 
singular narratives of Christ’s life synthesised, with illustrations, from the four 
Gospels. One was made for King Charles, at his request, in 1635; George 
Herbert having received his in 1631. The scholarly activity continued after 
Nicholas’s death in 1637, under the direction of his gifted nephew, also 
Nicholas, known as ‘The Linguist of Little Gidding’ (p. 174). 
Less persuasive, with regard to the fame of the place, after the demise of 
the community in the Civil War, is Ransome’s chapter on it as an inspiration of 
voluntary societies in the Church of England in the later seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. But her brief note that the somewhat romanticised 
memory of Gidding may have had some influence on the revival of monastic 
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life by the Catholic movement in Anglicanism in the nineteenth century rings 
true. 
This valuable book of careful scholarship, impeccably published by 
James Clarke, and well written, is important for all who are interested in 
seventeenth-century English Church history and of the golden age of Anglican 
divinity, nowhere more brilliantly espoused than in the poetry of the age – from 
which, rather surprisingly, Dr Ransome quotes not a single line. 
 
Barry Spurr 
University of Sydney 
 
 
William Lad Sessions, Honor for Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation 
and Defence (United Kingdom: Bloomsbury, 2012) pp. xiii + 210, ISBN: 978-
1-4411-4638-0 
 
Honor For Us is an interesting consideration of the concept and conceptions of 
personal honour. Sessions’ book is primarily a philosophy text and is aimed at 
an audience for whom discussions of the concept of honour have fallen by the 
wayside. However, despite his oblique reference to the social sciences, I would 
suggest that this book has more value for such an audience than it does for 
philosophers.  
The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, Sessions 
delineates the field of study highlighting that this book is about a particular 
concept of honour; personal honour. Briefly defined, personal honour is 
“adhering firmly to the honor code of some honor group and being loyal to its 
members” (p.26) and is differentiated from five other concepts: conferred 
honour, recognition honour, positional honour, commitment honour, and trust 
honour. Sessions’ argument is that while there are similarities between these 
various different concepts, and aspects of the others are found within personal 
honour, it is a distinctive category of its own. Further to this, Sessions also 
argues in subsequent chapters that personal honour, while relatable to, is not 
equivocal with either religion or morality. He also addresses the question of 
‘deviant honour’ as it occurs within sociology, and argues that we cannot label 
honour groups deviant from the level of honour groups, and such a position 
requires an objectification of one society’s standards.  
In the second section, having laid out the criteria for personal honour 
and honour groups, Sessions makes the case that these groups are not just 
something ‘they’ have. He notes that in social scientific literature there is a 
tendency to view honour as an archaic concept that ‘Other’ groups have and 
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that ‘our’ groups have long since grown out of. To show that honour is in fact a 
relevant concept as much for ‘us’ as it is for ‘them’, Sessions identifies various 
cases that he argues are classifiable as honour groups. These cases are: 
warriors, sportsmanship, patriotism, academia, and professions (specifically 
law). With each, he tries to show that these groups can be adequately 
understood in terms of personal honour. 
In the third section, Sessions makes some normative arguments 
regarding this notion of personal honour and honour groups. In the first 
chapter, he makes a defence of honour against the various charges: that 
personal honour is little more than conferred or recognition honour; it is 
confined to limited conditions and is relative; honour groups are small, non-
egalitarian, violent, and patriarchal. For the final chapter, Sessions makes some 
arguments as to the benefit of having honour groups in our society and how 
thinking in terms of personal honour can overcome a number of dichotomies 
such as insider/outsider and improve the individual’s self-regard.  
The strongest section of this book is the first in which Sessions makes a 
strong definitional case for the concept of personal honour. He clearly defines 
the criteria so that if applied to actual contexts they can be easily identified. His 
arguments as to what personal honour is not are lucid and clear, and the only 
fault with them is the assumption of universality that underpins his 
understanding of morality. He takes it for granted that morality should be 
universal and does little to question why this might be the case. Aside from 
this, the following two sections become progressively weaker. Having made a 
strong case for the analytic concept of honour, the second section is then filled 
with rather general cases of where it might be applied. Rather than selecting 
specific case studies with identifiable samples, he suggests the various ways in 
which honour can be applied to whole classes of people with very few 
examples. There are a few too many cases of “honour could…” and “honour 
might…” with no real backing from actual examples. This is particularly 
apparent in the case of professions and patriotism. The latter is an especially 
weak case and there is the sense that he is struggling to fit patriotism into this 
analytic concept. The difficulty of reconciling the diffuse number of patriots 
with the idea that honour groups must be, if not small, at least clearly 
demarcated, suggests that he is trying to extend the concept far beyond its own 
reach.  
Sessions’ tendency to talk in generalities is also the downfall of his 
normative section. Many from the social sciences would be naturally wary of 
such a section, but it must be remembered that Sessions is aiming his book at 
the philosophical community. Even then, the majority of his arguments are 
fairly weak and his defence of personal honour does not satisfactorily address 
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some of the criticisms. Take the case of inegalitarianism for instance. Sessions 
tries to show that honour groups do not have to be superior, but fails to realise 
that by definition as a “group” this is exactly what happens. This then causes 
confusion in his arguments about the moral treatment of outsiders. Another 
tension is the individual; in the second section, Sessions provides a strong 
critique of individualism, but by the third section he reverses his position and 
argues that personal honour defends individuality. In many other places, we are 
informed what honour can do (honour does not have to be violent for example) 
but rarely does Sessions justify why it should do that. The overall impression 
becomes one of a series of statements regarding honour rather than arguments 
for it.  
Honor For Us is a frustrating book; the concept of personal honour is 
potentially one of great analytic value and could have numerous applications, 
but Sessions does too little to capitalise on these. Philosophers may be 
underwhelmed by his arguments and many readers will find the vagueness of 
examples inconclusive. These weaknesses of the book should not put the reader 
off however; Sessions does at least show that honour is a concept that still has 
relevant application not just for ‘them’ but for ‘us’ too. The only downside for 
the reader is that if they come to do such an application, there is no benchmark 
against which to adequately compare their own results.  
 
Jonathan Tuckett 
University of Stirling 
 
 
Rosemary Hill, Stonehenge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) 
pp. 1 + 242, ISBN 978-0-674-03132-6 (Hdbk). 
 
This small format book is a popular study of Stonehenge that takes the model 
of reception history to assess the importance of the world’s most famous 
Neolithic monument. In Chapter 1, Hill situates Stonehenge in the academic 
discourse of contemporary archaeology. This chapter traces the development of 
its construction as it is currently understood, and highlights the sociologically 
interesting fact that “after the Middle Bronze Age, the history of Stonehenge is 
one of disuse and dilapidation” (p. 17). Chapter 2 reverts to the Middle Ages 
and considers medieval authors who speculated upon Stonehenge, including 
Henry of Huntingdon and Geoffrey of Monmouth, and comments on the sparse 
illustrative record (reproducing a small drawing from a Chronicle of the World 
dating from around 1440 CE). The bulk of the chapter is a discussion of the 
early modern antiquarians like John Aubrey, Aylett Sammes, John Toland, and 
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William Stukeley. The fanciful connection of the Druids with the monument is 
a major theme, and the revival of Druidic activity by Iolo Morganwg at 
Primrose Hill in London in 1792 is connected to the surge of interest in 
Stonehenge and the Druids fostered by antiquarianism. 
Chapter 3 considers Stonehenge as it was received by architects, in 
particular Inigo Jones, his pupil John Webb, and John Wood, who constructed 
the Circus in Bath on the model of the great Neolithic ring. Modern readers 
will be amused by the heated arguments as to whether Stonehenge was Roman, 
Tuscan, or Buddhist. Hill’s treatment of John Wood’s Choir Gaure, Vulgarly 
Called Stonehenge, on Salisbury Plain (1747), in which he argued that the 
stone circle at Stanton Drew was a Druidic university, and invoked Joseph of 
Arimathea, Glastonbury’s occult Christian heritage, and Bladud the legendary 
king of Bath, is extremely entertaining. Chapter 4 discusses the Romantic 
reception of Stonehenge, focusing on the poets William Wordsworth and 
William Blake, and artistic renditions by J. M. W. Turner, John Constable, 
James Barry, and others.  
Chapter 5 traces the Victorian idea of Stonehenge, commenting on the 
emergence of archaeology as an academic discipline (with the discovery of 
ancient cities including Nineveh, Troy and Babylon) and the emergence of a 
movement dedicated to the preservation of national monuments and treasures. 
The particular contribution of John Lubbock (1834-1913), who was the son-in-
law of General Pitt-Rivers the first appointed Inspector of Ancient Monuments, 
is treated in detail. Chapter 6, ‘Archaeology, Astronomy, and the Age of 
Aquarius’, brings the story of Stonehenge to the present with a brief but 
informative sketch of twentieth century developments such as the findings of 
scholarly archaeological excavations, the sustained campaign by modern 
Druids to have access to the stones at certain sacred times of the year, the free 
festival movement, and the appearance of Stonehenge in popular cultural 
forms, tourism posters, rock film-clips, and the like. The final chapter discusses 
archaeological discoveries from the most recent dig, the Stonehenge Riverside 
Project, led by Mike Parker-Pearson of Sheffield University (which has yielded 
much fascinating information, especially regarding the nearby henge at 
Durrington Walls). It also considers the effects of Salisbury Plain being 
classified a World Heritage Site, and offers tips for the modern tourist. Hill’s 
Stonehenge is a marvellous book, aesthetically pleasing, filled with intriguing 
information, and drawing attention to many understandings of the monument 
over time that are still fascinating and relevant. It is highly recommended. 
 
Carole M. Cusack 
University of Sydney 
